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Productivity in American Whaling:
The New Bedford Fleet in the Nineteenth Century
From the end of the War of 1812 until the Civil War the New Bedford
whaling fleet grew spectacularly; thereafter it declined, equally
spectacularly. By the end of the century New Bedford's day was over.
the 88 years of this period, the technical configuration of the fleet,
hunting grounds visited, and the types of whales pursued all changed
dramatically, and more than once.
The literature on whaling suggests that the collapse of the industry was
due, in part, to declining productivity, occasioned by the disappearance of
the whales (because of over—hunting) and the deterioration of the quality of
labor. The shifts in the composition of the fleet are viewed, chiefly, as the
result of efforts by whalemen to overcome their problems.
In this paper, productivity data (superlative indexes), by voyage, are
employed in multiple regression analysis to trace the relationships between
the changes in the composition of the fleet and productivity. The propositions
that declining labor quality and whale stocks had important consequences for





















In economics, productivity change is often associated with technical
change, an inward movement of a production frontier. Looking at the matter
from the level of the firm, where, after all, the principal relevant
decisions are made, it is customary to focus on the choice of an
appropriate technology, with attention devoted to the role of factor prices
in determining exactly where on the frontier the firm will locate its
production activities.'
Life in the firm, however, is likely to be more complex than this
model suggests. Frequently there are many productive operations, and each
could be affected by a variety of alternative techniques. Each technique,
in turn, may employ a range of types of labor and forms of capital. Over
time, techniques, factor prices, and output prices all can change. New
opportunities crop up and new problems appear. The defensive actions of
the firm faced by a new problem may be as important (by preventing the
deterioration of productivity) as the firm's decision to exploit a new
opportunity. Finally, the level of productivity may be importantly
influenced by decisions that are only peripherally (if at all) related to
matters of production technique in the usual sense of the phrase. The
decision to open a new source of a raw material or to exploit a new market
are two obvious examples.
This paper examines productivity in the context of the complete web of
entrepreneurial decisions influencing production. We are interested in the
reactions of entrepreneurs to shifting opportunities and problems, the ways
in which decisions about technique are related to other business decisions,
and the relative weights of the factors influencing productivity.
Whaling was competitive -- theindustry was made up of many,
relatively small, firms. Major decisions were in the hands of the whaling2
agent who hired the crew, rigged and provisioned the vessel, laid plans for
the voyage, provided the captain with access to overseas credit and with
information and guidance before and during the voyage.2 We are interested
in the choices the agents made, the influence of exogenous developments on
these choices, and the impact of the agent's decisions on the productivity
of the venture. The unit of analysis is the individual whaling voyage, for
the voyage was the focus of all of these decisions.
Part (2) provides a brief historical and economic background. Part
(3) describes the data set, and Part (4), the system for measuring
productivity. Part (5) lays out the opportunities and problems facing
agents and the choices they were obliged to make. It also develops the
variables that figure in the empirical analysis. Part (6) contains the
empirical analysis, and Part (7) is a summary of conclusions.
(2) Historical Economic Background
In July of 1842 seaman Herman Melville deserted the whaler Acushnet in
the Marquesas, where he spent a month with the natives of the Taipi Valley.
He subsequently treated this experience in his novel Typee. Before he
finally reached home he had material for three more books, Omoo, Mardi, and
Moby-Dick. The first two were based on visits to Tahiti and Eimo,
occasioned by a second desertion (this time from an Australian whaler), the
last, on Melville's life aboard the Acushnet and later the Nantucket whaler
Charles and Henry, on which he served as boatsteerer. The dates of
Melville's sailing from Fairhaven aboard the Acushnet, January 1841, and of
his publication of Moby-Dick, October 1851 (in London, under the title ]
Whale),nicely delineate the apogee of American whaling.
Although the peak of American whaling occurred in 1841-1851, the3
history of the industry spanned centuries. It began with the first
colonial settlements along the east coast of North America and persisted,
albeit weakly, until 1974 when whaling was finally outlawed.3 Long before
whaling became illegal, the mode of whaling celebrated by Melville had
disappeared and had been replaced by modern methods pioneered by the
Norwegians. The Americans never adopted the new techniques on a large
scale and were effectively out of whaling by the beginning of World War I.
The industry has changed in other ways as well. Modern whalers seek whale
meat and cooking oils, rather than the illuminants, lubricants, and
structural materials brought back by Melville's whalemen. Modern whaling
is therefore an entirely new industry, prosecuted by new techniques in
pursuit of new ends.
By the outbreak of the Revolution, the American whaling industry had
evolved from a land-based operation into a deep-sea industry. In its
earliest stages whalemen stuck close to shore, Whales were sighted from
the beach and hunted down from small boats. The process of rendering the
blubber into oil took place on land. Gradually, however, whalemen left the
shore, and instead of waiting for whales to swim close to land, went
looking for the whales. Technological change and geographical expansion
occurred rapidly. By the 1770's the process of rendering blubber had been
moved aboard the vessel, and Yankee whalemen were routinely cruising the
Atlantic from Newfoundland to the Falkland Islands.4
Favorable market conditions helped to foster these developments.
Blessed with a growing export market in Great Britain, the colonial whale
fishery expanded until 1774 when, in the words of Alexander Starbuck, the
Revolutionary War caught the industry in its "full tide ofsuccess."5 For
the next forty years it suffered a series of major economic reversals, and4
at no time were conditions stable long enough to allow it to experience any
period of sustained growth.6
Although our subject is the American whaling industry, most of the
material used in this paper refers to vessels that sailed from New Bedford,
Massachusetts. Nantucket had been the principal American whaling port at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, and San Francisco assumed that
position at the end. In the years between 1825 and 1890, however, New
Bedford dominated the industry. Subject to some year-to-year variation,
over those sixty-five years, the port's vessels, on average, represented
more than fifty percent of the nation's whaling tonnage (see Table 1).
Moreover, while vessels from other ports tended to specialize in certain
whaling grounds and in either sperm or baleen whales, the New Bedford
whalers ranged over all the world's hunting grounds and sought both species
of whales. Thus the New Bedford whalers not only constitute a
representative sample of the American industry, but they also present a
microcosmic picture of the behavior of the firms that made up the industry.
Our study encompasses more than half of the American industry; the
Americans, in turn, operated about eight-tenths of the world's whaling
fleet over the last eight decades of the 19th century. There had been some
British competition before the 1840's; the Australians hunted whales
throughout the period; and, after the mid 1890's, the Norwegians dominated
the industry; but between 1820 and 1890 the industry was virtually an
American monopoly.
Marine biologists inform us that there are two types of proper whales:
the baleen (suborder Mysticeti) and the catchelot (suborder Odonoceti). In
the 19th century the Americans hunted one variety of catchelot (the sperm
whale) and four varieties of baleen: the right, the gray, the bowhead, and5
the humpback.
The five varieties do not all inhabit the same parts of the ocean.
Sperm whales are found in the tropical and subtropical regions of the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans. The rights prefer cooler waters.
They travel in the North Atlantic from Bermuda to Greenland, in the North
Pacific from Japan to the Pacific Northwest and as far north as the Arctic
circle, and in the South Atlantic from Brazil, and in South Pacific from
Chile, to the Antarctic ocean. The whalers looked for bowheads in the
Arctic ocean, the Okhotsk Sea, the Bering Straits, and the North Pacific
above the 54th parallel; however, since those animals had discovered the
Northwest Passage centuries before Martin Frobisher began his fruitless
search, they also appeared in Hudson's Bay and in Davis Strait. Like the
sperms and rights, the humpbacks and grays inhabit the more temperate
climes.
During the first few decades of the nineteenth century, sperm oil and
spermacete were used primarily as illuminants. Spermacete, a solid, made
the highest quality candles; sperm oil was burned in lighthouses and public
buildings where high intensity illumination was required. In the second
and particularly in the third quarter of the century, sperm oil came to be
used increasingly as a lubricant to ease the movements of light, rapidly
moving machines (the spindles of cotton and woolen mills, for example). In
fact, the expansion of sperm oil production after 1830 matches very closely
the rise of the cotton textile industry.
Whale oil, obtained from the blubber of baleen whales, was the
illuminant chosen by the average consumer. Technically inferior to sperm
oil both as an illuminant and as a lubricant, its relatively low price made
it one of the most popular lamp fuels in the 1820's, '30's, and early6
'40's.7 By the latter dates whale oil began to face ever stiffening
competition from new illuminants (coal oil, coal gas, and, in the 1850's,
kerosene), but total sales held up fairly well as manufacturers began to
use it to lubricate their heavy machinery.8
Whalebone, or baleen, is not really whale bone but the bone-like
screen that the whale uses as a filter to separate its food (kriil) from
sea water. In the nineteenth century, whalebone was used in the
manufacture of stays, corsets, hoops, whips, umbrellas, carriage shades,
and almost any other product that required a strong flexible material --
needsnow met by plastics and specialty steels.
The quantity of sperm oil that the fleet brought home increased
rapidly from 1820 until the late 1830's. Then growth ceased, although
output remained fairly constant until the middle of the next decade. By
the late 1840's, however, the catch had begun to decline. The fall
continued, although with some significant pauses, until the end of the
century (see Table 2). The real price of sperm oil doubled between 1820
and 1850 but then began to fall; by the end of the century the price was no
higher than it had been in 1820.
The quantity of whale oil that the captains brought back to New
Bedford increased until the early 1850's, stabilized until the Civil War,
and then began an almost continuous decline. In no post-helium year did
output come close to matching its pre-war peak. Over the nine decades the
real price of whale oil displayed a profile that was similar to that of
sperm oil except that the decline in the second half of the century was
more gentle. Over most of the period the ratio of the price of sperm oil
to the price of whale oil averaged about 2:1; by 1900, however, the ratio
had fallen to 3:2.7
At the beginning of the nineteenth century whalebone was in such small
demand that captains often refused to surrender the valuable storage space
needed to bring it back. Gradually, as demand increased, returning cargoes
contained more and more of the strong, flexible material. By the Civil
War, high prices --pricesinflated by the fashions of the day -- made
whalebone a very desirable addition to a whaler's catch. Indeed, the case
can be made that it was the growing demand for whalebone that kept the
fishery profitable and encouraged the pursuit of the Arctic bowhead. Like
whale oil, the quantity of whalebone brought back increased yearly until
the mid 1850's, peaked at that time, and then began to decline. Output
recovered some ground in the 1880's, but even at that time it did not reach
the levels attained before the War. Because of the rapid rise in price,
however, the value of the bone brought back continued torise.10 The real
price, in fact, rose from $.lO a pound in 1820 to more than $5.00 a pound
in 1905. Exports of baleen (primarily to England, France, and Germany)
commanded a significant proportion of total output over the entire
nineteenth century.11
Given the similarity in the production paths of all three of the
industry's major products, it should not come as a surprise that the
fortunes of the industry improved steadily from the end of the War of 1812
until some time in the mid 1850's and then gradually declined. The
industry had, in fact, all but disappeared by the time of the Archduke's
assassination in the streets of Sarajevo. The real value of the industry's
total output was about $1.2 million in 1820, it had reached $12 million by
mid-century, but it had fallen to less than $1.2 million fifty years later.
The geographic dispersion of the stock of whales meant that New
Bedford whalers could be found all over the world. The chronicler of the8
port's fleet lists no fewer than fifty-one whaling grounds, but for our
analysis the fifty-one have been grouped into four: (1) the Atlantic Ocean,
Hudson's Bay and Davis Strait, (2) the Indian Ocean, (3) the Pacific Ocean,
and (4) the Western Arctic.
If interest centers on their relative contribution to New Bedford's
prosperity over the entire ninety-year period, the list, in order of
importance, would be the Pacific, the Atlantic, the Indian, and finally,
the Arctic; however, within those nine decades the contribution of
individual grounds ebbed and flowed (see Table 3). There were, for
example, no voyages to any of the western grounds in the last decade of the
period. The Indian Ocean drew a significant fraction of the city's fleet
only in the middle decades, a period that saw almost no vessels hunting in
the Atlantic. Finally, although the Arctic drew whaling captains from New
Bedford in only four of the nine decades, during those four decades it was
by far the most profitable.
It is a long way from New Bedford to the Arctic Ocean. The vessels
employed in the trade depended on the wind for power, and once on station
it was still necessary to find the whales. As a result, voyages were long,
averaging almost three years (see Table 4). Over time, the length of a
typical voyage increased. Although the increase was due in part to the
opening of grounds further and further removed from the New England coast,
it was also due to a non-trivial increase in the length of stay in each
ground. A trip to the Atlantic averaged less than two years while a
typical voyage to the Arctic or Pacific, which might have taken only two
years when the ground first opened, took almost four in the 1870's.
As the whaling fleets of New England began to hunt more extensively in
the Pacific, captains found it efficient to restock and refit during a9
voyage. In response to these needs the ports of Honolulu and Lahaina
emerged as rendezvous points. There whalers could pick up fresh
provisions, recruit new seamen, and repair their vessels. Beginning about
1840 the Hawaiian ports and Panama also became important centers for
transshipnients of oil and bone.12 Captains wishing to continue whaling
were able to ship their catch on whalers or merchant ships returning to New
England.
Despite the widespread innovation of iron ships and steam power in the
passenger and carrying trades, the New Bedford whalers that undertook those
three- and four-year voyages were virtually all sailing vessels. Ships,
barks, brigs, sloops, and schooners all found employment in whaling, but
most of the fleet was made up of ships and barks. Taken together the
brigs, sloops, and schooners made up less than five percent of the number
of vessels in the New Bedford total, and they represented only two percent
of the city's total whaling tonnage.
Ships accounted for fifty-six percent of the number of vessels that
sailed from New Bedford. They were relatively large vessels, averaging
about 350 tons, but they were set apart from the barks, brigs, sloops, and
schooners not so much by their relatively greater size as by their rigging.
They had three square-rigged masts (i.e., sails were set on yard arms
attached at the center to the masts). The barks that made up thirty-nine
percent of the vessels operating out of New Bedford were on average, at 285
tons, smaller than the ships. More importantly, they were square-rigged on
the fore and main masts and fore-and-aft rigged on the mizzen (i.e., on the
rear mast sails were set vertically and were attached directly to the mast
and to the stern of the vessel). The average size of both classes of
vessel rose over the first four decades. For the increase was about twenty10
percent, for barks, about twice that. Thus by the 1860's when a typical
ship had attained a size of about 380 tons an average bark was 320.
Ships were the rigging of choice when the industry emerged from the
wartime doldrums and they retained that position through most of the period
of expansion (see Table 5). Gradually, however, the number of barks
increased in absolute and, even more impressively, as the fleet began to
contract, in relative terms. In 1845 there had been one bark for every 5.3
ships; by 1875 the ratio had been reversed, and there was one bark for
every .53 ships.
The post-bellum increase in the proportion of barks underscores two
characteristics of the whaling fleet. First, the capital stock was very
malleable. Even as vessels shifted from whaling to the merchant marine and
the whaling fleet contracted, new barks were constructed and ships were
rerigged as barks. Second, as the demand for whalebone rose, the bowheads
of the Arctic became an ever more favored target; the rise in the
importance of that northern ground, with its ice bergs and ice pack, put an
increased premium on maneuverability -- animportant feature of the bark-
rigged vessel.
Although barks were better able to escape the winter freeze, losses at
sea of all types of vessels were very high. Of the approximately seven
hundred and fifty vessels that sailed at least once from New Bedford in
search of whales, no fewer than two hundred and thirty-one were lost. The
crude loss rate per voyage averaged almost nine percent; the loss rate per
year at sea was 3.2 percent (2.6 for ships, 3.5 for barks, and an
astounding 8.6 percent for the brigs, schooners, and sloops that made up
the remainder of the fleet --seeTable 6).
No summary of the industry could be complete without some mention of11
the men who manned the whalers. On average, twenty-seven men (including
three or four officers) were needed to sail and hunt a ship. Because a
bark was, on average, smaller, it required only about twenty-three (see
Table 7). However, although the bark used a smaller crew, it actually
represented a more labor-intensive technology; the trade-off faced by the
agent who planned the voyage was between greater maneuverability and higher
labor costs. Over time, average crew size increased for both classes of
vessel. In the case of ships, for example, the figure rose from twenty-one
to thirty-three. Although average vessel size was increasing, the size of
the crew was rising even more rapidly; between 1820 and 1905 the
labor/capital ratio rose by about fifteen percent.
Whaling was a risky enterprise. A sailor risked life and limb. The
owner risked the loss of his vessel, and, depending upon the luck of the
hunt, he also faced financial feast or famine. In an attempt to spread the
risk, the owners and seamen adopted a system of labor payments that made
remuneration depend on the success of the voyage.
Every member of the crew was entitled to a fraction (a lay) of the net
receipts of the voyage. On average, the total labor share amounted to
slightly more than one-third of the receipts from the sale of the catch.
Although there are examples of total lays as low as twenty-six percent and
as high as thirty-seven percent, the average was about thirty-four.
Individual crewmen were compensated on the basis of the position held and
their level of skill and experience. Thus a captain's share was typically
about one-sixteenth, but there were voyages where the captain received as
much as one-eight and others where his pay fell as low as one-twentieth.
Progressively smaller shares were allocated to the other officers, the
cooper, the boatsteerers, seamen, other artisans (blacksmiths, carpenters,12
sailmakers, etc.), ordinary seamen, greenhands, and boys. The latter, the
youngest and least skilled crewmen, typically received a share of about
one-two hundred and fiftieth.
The industry expanded and then contracted, and that pattern is
reflected in the catch and profit figures. In the case of sperm oil, there
is evidence of some decrease in the catch as new vessels entered, but, as
exit reduced competition, it appears to have rebounded strongly (see Table
8). For whale oil, however, the pattern is one of fairly continuous
decline. Finally, while the pattern for whalebone is somewhat mixed, it
appears that the "catch" increased to about 1850, remained at those levels
until the mid 1880's, and then fell as the New Bedford fleet, faced with
competition from vessels based on the West Coast, began to withdraw from
the Arctic grounds.
The trends in catch correlate closely with the movements in profits
(see Table 9). Profits appear to have declined through the mid 1850's --a
decline most likely associated with increased competition --andthen, as
competition lessened, they increased once again. The post-bellum increase
was sufficient to return industry profits to the levels that had prevailed
in the earlier years.
Of perhaps even greater interest, however, is the average level of the
industry's profits. Although subject to a great deal of year-to-year (and
voyage-to-voyage) variation, the average appears to have been about forty-
five percent per year (with allowance for vessels lost at sea). That
figure is consistent with contemporary observations; it provides some
insight into the level of "normal" profits in a risky, but competitive,
industry. Certainly it does suggest the motivation that induced ship
owners to continue to send their vessels out in search of whales even when13
there was one chance in ten that the vessel would not return. As late as
1900, although ships appear to have proved no longer profitable, the owners
of the fifteen or so barks, brigs, sloops and schooners that remained in
the fleet were earning nearly seventy percent per year on their investment.
(3) Sources of Data
At the heart of the analysis presented in this paper is a set of
measurements of productivity computed at the level of the individual
voyage. Most, but not all, of the whaling voyages that ended at New
Bedford in the years 1820-1906 are represented in the data set. The
productivity estimates enter as dependent variables in a regression
analysis designed to explain the variations of productivity across voyages.
The principal source of data is a Baker Library manuscript produced by
Joseph Dias, probably a whaling captain himself, and certainly the son and
grandson of whaling captains.13 Dias apparently took his data from ships
logs, newspapers, and port records, as did those better- known students of
whaling, Alexander Starbuck and Reginald B. Hegarty.14 The Dias manuscript
covers a longer period of time than do the works of Starbuck or Hegarty,
and it is organized by vessel. Both the Starbuck and Hegarty volumes are
organized by voyage, a much less convenient system. The Starbuck and
Hegarty volumes, together with Whaling Masters, were used to check Dias and
to fill out his record, but Dias is the primary source of the analyses in
this paper.15
Dias recorded the following information for each New Bedford
whaling vessel:
(1) the dates of each of its voyages (sailing and return),
(2) the names of the captain and agent at each voyage,14
(3) the vessel type (ship, bark, brig, sioop, schooner)
(4) the date and place of construction (usually),
(5) incidents of rerigging (ships were sometimes rerigged as barks),
(6) the mode of exit from the fleet (condemnation, transfer to
another port, loss by sinking, running aground, fire, etc.),
(7) the product of each voyage, in physical units (sperm oil, whale
oil, whalebone, occasionally other products),
(8) hunting grounds visited (Dias identified 51, which we combined
into four: (a) the Atlantic Ocean, Davis Strait, and Hudson's Bay; (b) the
Indian Ocean; (c) the Pacific Ocean; (d) the Arctic Sea north of the
Pacific, Bering Strait, and Okhotsk Sea),
(9) the tonnage of the vessel (a measure of capacity),16
(10) quite rich notes on events of the voyage, particularly touching
the loss of men to disease, accidents aboard, desertion, and the attacks of
whales, mutineers, islanders of the northern and southern seas.
The mode of entry into the fleet -- constructionor transfer in from
another port or the merchant marine --canbe inferred from the
construction and voyage data.
While the Dias data set contains a good deal of information on
capital, output, and firm organization, as well as various vessel traits
and activities that might have affected productivity, it does not report
output prices, factor shares in income, or labor and land (i.e., the stock
of whales) inputs -- informationnecessary to estimate productivity and
interpret the estimates. Price data are readily available, notably in
Starbuck and Tower. Officers and crewmen were paid subsistence and a share
of the product, each man's share being referred to as a "lay." Lays
commonly ranged from ten to twenty percent for captains to .2 to .4 of a15
percent for green boys, and summed to about one-third of the value of
output; we assumed a total lay of thirty-four percent for all voyages.
Subsistence has been estimated to have been about $35-60 per man per year,
in prices of 1844.17 As between these two values the choice does not
appear important. The productivity results obtained are virtually
identical, regardless of which is used.
There are three important sources of labor data; none is perfect; the
two that appear most comprehensive were used.18 Two caveats: First, while
the labor data cover all of the years under consideration they are more
nearly complete for the periods 1820-1834 and 1840-1880. Second, the data
refer chiefly to crewmen recruited before vessels left New Bedford. Extra
crewmen were sometimes added in the Canaries or Hawaii; more often, crewmen
who died or deserted were replaced at a port of call. The data provide,
therefore, no more than a rough index of the average number of men aboard
during a voyage, but there is no reason to believe that errors in the labor
data bias our results.
(4) Productivity. Indexes19
The measure of productivity chosen is a translog multilateral
productivity index, a so-called ttsuperlativeindex."20 The index has
characteristics that are very well suited to the industry and the problems
under analysis. It is designed to handle multi-product firms and
industries, of the type represented by nineteenth-century American whaling.
The underlying model assumes optimizing behavior and is, therefore, clearly
suited to competitive activities of the likes of American whaling. The
measure was developed to permit multilateral comparisons and as a result it
is not subject to base reversal problems, a very important characteristic16
since the voyage productivity estimates were to be used in a regression
analysis. Moreover, it is readily computed and economical of data,
requiring no more evidence than is available.
There are, however, few examples of absolute perfection, and the
index, while superlative, is not one of them. It poses one minor and
readily handled computational problem. Two other difficulties arise out of
the application of the index to whaling and to individual whaling voyages.
As to the computational problem, whalers typically returned with whale
oil, sperm oil, and whalebone, but not infrequently, they returned with
only two, say whale oil and bone, or one, say sperm oil. Occasionally they
even came back ttclean,tt that is, with no marketable catch. Since the
superlative index cannot handle zeroes, these cases posed problems. The
first two might have been solved by distinguishing three separate whaling
industries, one specializing in baleen whales, one in sperm whales, and the
third a generalist baleen-sperm industry.21 Such an approach, however,
would distort the reality of nineteenth-century New Bedford whaling.
Whalers did not regularly specialize to the exclusion of one type of whale.
It is true that a vessel setting out for the Arctic was after bowheads
(baleens), but between New Bedford and the Arctic it passed through waters
inhabited by sperm whales and was prepared to take them, as opportunity
afforded. Once the western Arctic was opened, a common pattern was to hunt
bowheads and then, in the off season, move to California to take gray
whales, or to the coasts of New Zealand and Australia for humpbacks and
sperm whales. Moreover, as prices and opportunities shifted, vessels
emphasized one type of activity over another. Thus it appears that New
Bedford whaling should be regarded as one industry, not three.
A better solution to the computational problem is to substitute small17
positive values for the zeros. If values much less than e (the base of
natural logs) are selected, large negative weights are assigned to the
shares accorded the missing products, and the results that emerge are
counter-intuitive. For example, with a value of .001, a relatively
unsuccessful voyage that resulted, nonetheless, in three types of output
might register a higher level of productivity than a successful voyage with
only two. These anomalies disappear with values in excess of e. Three and
ten, both very small values when compared with typical whaling output
levels, were tried. The results of the two sets of calculations were
similar, suggesting that the index is not very sensitive to the specific
value selected as long as it is small but greater than e.22
A second and more serious problem emerges because there is no obvious
way to introduce land --thatis, the stocks of whales --directlyinto the
productivity calculations. Thus, the indexes do not measure total factor
productivity, but only the productivity of labor and capital. In an
attempt to work around this problem, whale stocks were introduced on the
right-hand side of the regression, as independent variables helping to
explain the level of productivity of labor and capital.
Finally, and most seriously, the calculations do not include the
effects of truly disastrous voyages -- voyagesfrom which vessels failed to
return. The indexes refer only to vessels that came back to New Bedford.
The omission is unlikely to have affected the long-term drift of our
productivity measurement for the industry as a whole, since, over time,
loss rates do not seem to have changed dramatically, on average. (See
Table 6.) Of course, the level and the year-to-year variations are
affected, but the former is unimportant and the latter are not the chief
concern of this paper.18
Of more importance, however, is the effect of the exclusion of
disastrous voyages from the regressions. Whaling was a risky
business in which luck and the skill of the agent and captain -- neither
figuring directly in our regression analysis -- playedimportant roles.
One therefore has to expect a substantial amount of unexplained variance.
If the disastrous voyages were introduced into the analysis, the
unexplained variance would, no doubt, increase. Moreover, since older
vessels had higher loss rates than younger ones, and since loss rates
varied among hunting grounds, the age and hunting ground variables would
also be affected but, happily, in predictable ways.23




where: the R's are the shares of total revenue produced by the three
individual outputs;
the Y's are quantities of individual outputs;
the W's are factor shares of income;
the X's are quantities of factor inputs;
the R's, Y's, W's, and X's are average values across all
observations.
Three outputs --spermoil, whale oil, and baleen --andtwo inputs --
laborand capital (man months and ton months) --aredistinguished.24
The sources of the evidence and our estimating decisions have been
discussed in Section (3), above.19
(5) Influences on Productivity
The productivity index for the whole New Bedford industry declines
from 1820 --whenthe industry was still very small --tothe mid 1830's,
when the industry was quite large. During the period of its maturity (1835
onward), New Bedford whaling exhibited less pronounced changes in
productivity. Plotted, the productivity index describes a profile like
that of a dinner plate: it declines, gradually flattens out, and finally
rises again (see the chart). Although a trend line fitted to the index in
the years of maturity exhibits little movement, the industry was by no
means quiescent in the period. It changed dramatically in size, in the
composition of its capital stock, in the structure of its output, in the
relative importance of the hunting grounds it visited, in the sources of
its labor supply, in the ways in which production was organized, in its
techniques of production, and, no doubt, in other ways as well. The
changes reflected responses to shifts in the environment in which the New
Bedford whalers operated, and represented the efforts of whaling men to
cope with new problems and to exploit new opportunities. The central
concern of this paper is with the estimation of the direction in which, and
the strength with which, each of these influences pressed productivity. We
want to understand the forces affecting the industry and the ways in which
its entrepreneurs and managers responded to them. The following
subsections consider the factors that influenced productivity and attempt












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The drift of the industry productivity index across time, the
persistent search for new hunting grounds, contemporary complaints, and
even the structure of output, all suggest that, as the industry expanded,
there were pressures on the stock of whales. The evidence on stocks before
large-scale hunting began, on the procreative capacities of the whales, and
on the amount of hunting conducted in the nineteenth century suggests that
there was no global problem, no general ecological disaster resulting from
American whaling in the 19th century.25 Depletion of some hunting grounds,
and possibly some species of whales, however, might have required whalers
to seek out new grounds, the search raising costs and reducing the
productivity of capital and labor.
To test this proposition we developed annual indexes of hunting
pressures on the whale populations of the four hunting grounds. Pressure
index numbers reflecting hunting dates and destinations were attached to
each voyage. Thus a vessel that hunted in the Pacific had assigned to it
sperm and baleen pressure index numbers relevant to the Pacific and to the
dates of the voyage. If excessive hunting was reducing the productivity of
whaling capital and labor, the regression coefficients of these indexes
should have negative signs. (Details are contained in Appendix 1.)
(b) Vessel Competition
There is a second possible effect of hunting on measured productivity.
Even if whale stocks were not being depleted, increased hunting might lead
to lower productivity simply because of greater competition among vessels.
One vessel coming upon a pod of sperm whales might be able to take all the
largest whales by itself; however, if it approached the pod in company with21
other vessels, it would be less likely to come away with as many barrels of
oil. The one case slides over into the other, of course. One vessel alone
would be unable completely to destroy a pod, but three or four vessels
might do so. Still, it appears useful to distinguish analytically between
the two cases. To that end a second index reflecting whaling competition
in each year and in each hunting ground was constructed. The index number
for any given ground and year is a ratio: the numerator is the number of
vessel tons leaving for the hunting ground two years previously, divided by
300 (to convert the tons to "standardized vessels"). The denominator is
the number of whales (all species combined) in the ground before intensive
hunting began, per 100 square miles in the hunting ground. Thus the index
can be interpreted as the number of standard sized vessels per whale per
100 square miles per hunting ground. Since the index is designed to
measure competition in the ground, it could be expected to carry a negative
coefficient in the regression, if competition affected productivity
unfavorably. (Appendix 1 provides more details of the construction of the
index.)
(c) Specialization
The degree to which whalers specialized in a particular type of whale
varied from vessel to vessel and voyage to voyage. In an effort to see how
far specialization mattered we included dununy variables indicative of the
degree and type of specialization. Specifically, we divided voyages into
three groups (of roughly equal size): those in which sperm oil contributed
at least ninety percent of the value of output, those in which whale oil
and baleen contributed at least ninety percent of the value of output, and
all others. This device also helps to deal with a technical problem. All22
productivity indexes have trouble dealing effectively with output mixes far
removed from the mean mix and the superlative index is no exception. The
specialization dunimies segregate voyages in which the degree of
specialization was pronounced and permit the regression to standardize for
them (the issue is discussed further below).
(d) Hunting Grounds
The search for whales carried New Bedford whalers from the Atlantic to
the Indian and Pacific oceans, and finally to that bonanza ground, the
western Arctic. One would expect to find productivity varying initially
from ground to ground, the differences disappearing as the fleet adjusted
its hunting activities. In the case of the Arctic, however, equilibrium
was probably not achieved before the New Bedford whalers began abandoning
their home port for the west coast port of San Francisco. Furthermore, the
Arctic was by far the most dangerous ground, exhibiting much higher rates
of vessel loss than the other grounds. Thus, even if whalemen, owners, and
agents were risk neutral, it should have taken higher rates of gain, gross,
to attract whalers to the Arctic. Therefore, since the analysis excludes
vessels that were lost while whaling, one would expect that vessels hunting
in the Arctic would appear to be more productive than vessels that avoided
that ground. As among other grounds, differences might be slight, with the
new grounds of the Indian and Pacific oceans perhaps displaying modestly
higher average productivities than the Atlantic.
One word of warning: Although acknowledged mixed voyages (i.e.,
voyages reported to have been to the Pacific and Arctic, for example) are
excluded from the regression data set, to some extent all voyages to any
ground but the Atlantic were mixed. That is, even if the vessel was sent23
to hunt in the Arctic, Indian, or Pacific Ocean, it was forced to pass
through other grounds, and captains seldom passed up a chance to catch a
whale. Moreover, if weather or catch proved discouraging captains
frequently steered to adjacent grounds for short periods of time. Thus the
assignment of ground should not be thought to have precluded the
possibility that the vessel hunted at least a little in other grounds.
(e) Rig Types
As time passed hunting grounds shifted, and so did the way vessels
were rigged. There had never been more than one or two of the smaller
vessels --brigs,sloops, and schooners --inthe Pacific and Indian
oceans, and there was none at all in the western Arctic, but by the middle
of the period they had all but disappeared from the Atlantic as well. Over
the first half of the period barks gradually eroded the dominant position
previously held by ships in all grounds, but they really came into their
own in the western Arctic, where the relative ease of handling and of
launching the two stern boats were matters of great importance.
In the regression, barks, brigs, sloops, and schooners are grouped
together. It should be kept in mind however that the three smaller classes
represented only a tiny fraction of the total. Thus the comparison is
really between ships and barks (excluding all but barks does not affect any
result).
The performance of this somewhat heterogeneous group was compared with
the performance of ships. The expectation as to sign is somewhat
ambiguous. Ships dominated in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific grounds in
most years, but barks were more important in the Arctic and ultimately
pushed their competitors from the other grounds as well. On net for all24
grounds and all years the coefficient on the ship dummy was thought likely
to be positive.
(f) Vessel Size
The shift toward ships and toward more distant grounds was associated
with an increase in the size of whalers, but vessel size also rose
independently of these developments. That is, standardizing for rig and
hunting ground, vessel size increased. The shift seems not to have been a
pure scale phenomenon.26 Tonnage was entered (squared, since tonnage also
appears in the formula used to estimate productivity) as an independent
variable. Given the shift toward larger vessels, we expected a positive
sign on the coefficient of this variable.
(g) Mode of Entry into the Fleet
Some vessels were built for whaling, others transferred into the fleet
froni the merchant marine, and still others, vessels that had originally
entered by one of these two routes, were rerigged (ships were often
rerigged as barks, particularly to hunt the Arctic). Ceteris paribus, one
would expect vessels built for the fleet to be most productive. Whether
one should expect this result to emerge from the statistical analysis,
however, is not so clear. In the flush times of New Bedford whaling,
particularly when the Arctic was opened, many vessels were quickly
transferred into the whaling fleet and many ships were rerigged as barks to
fit them for Arctic hunting. It took longer to design and build vessels to
exploit this rich ground, and, by the time these entrants were in service,
some of the "first arrival" gains had almost certainly evaporated.
Transferred and rerigged vessels may, then, exhibit unusually high25
productivity levels, for market as opposed to technical reasons.
(h) Age of Vessel
The age of the vessel (entered as age and age squared) also captures
the effects of more than a single set of forces. Elements of wear and tear
that influenced productivity, a technical characteristic that one might
hope to capture in the age variable, are confounded with the consequences
of qualitative differences among vessels. Effective vessels were
presumably survivors; ineffective vessels were transferred by their owners
to other activities, were condemned at an early age, or were destroyed in
service. The regression should pick up this influence as well as capital
consumption. Thus one could expect to find a positive sign on the
coefficient for age, as poor vessels were screened out with advancing age,
and a negative sign on the coefficient for age squared, as wear and tear
reduced even an efficient vessel's effectiveness.
As a second device for uncovering the influence of the deterioration
of a vessel's productive capacity, the last voyage of each vessel was
identified. If poor productivity performances eventually led to
condemnation or to transfer to other activities, the variable should have a
negative sign.
(i) Innovations
Although they were not equally important, three types of technical
innovations were widely adopted in the whaling fleet between the 1820's and
the 1880's. The first reflected improvements in maritime technology in
general; the other two were associated with improvements in whaling
narrowly defined. Although the years between 1820 and 1845 have been26
viewed by some specialists as technologically unprogressive, the period
was, in fact, marked by substantial technical progress. There was a series
of advances that were first tested in the merchant fleet and then borrowed
by the builders of whaling vessels. These advances included, in addition
to the substantial gains realized by improvements in the techniques of ship
construction, "patented rigging, deck machinery, and fittings. Such things
as geared capstans and windlasses, iron strapped blocks, geared
steering, .. .gearedwinches, new mast and spar ironwork. ..rodrigging and
turnbuckles, screw- or lever-operated, were [also] introduced."27 In
addition the number of sails was increased (the top sail, for example, was
divided into an upper and a lower half) for ease in handling.28
The second set of innovations was in vessel design: barks were
specifically designed for whaling. These new vessels were first built in
the vicinity of New Bedford in the mid-l850's. They were constructed with
raking stems and with sharper lines than the usual whalers. "The hull
design of these vessels had much in common with that of the clippers.
Their sailing qualities were disguised by the heavy appearance of the hull,
above water, which was emphasized by the deck houses and the whale boats
carried on strong davits [another innovation] or on skids above the deck.
These American whalers were built of wood, copper sheathed below the
29 . waterline. ..." Theywere, in fact, medium clippers, "sharp floored
and easy bilged to make them roll down when 'cutting out' a whale."3°
The third group of innovations was in "whalecraft," the implements
employed to capture and kill the whale --harpoons,lances, whale guns of
various types.31 According to Scammon (see Appendix 2) in a period of
twenty years these innovations had as revolutionary an impact on whaling as
had all the vessel design changes that took place between the 17th and the27
late 19th centuries. The successful inventions were made in the relatively
short period, 1848-1865, and were widely diffused by the mid-1870's. The
most significant of the group, the darting gun, was invented last (1865),
and did not begin to diffuse rapidly until the early 1870's.
(See Appendix 2.)
Unfortunately, the Dias data do not indicate the equipment carried on
the various whaling voyages. The period during which the innovations
diffused is clear, however, as well as the fact that they diffused very
widely. In the regression, therefore, a dummy was entered to distinguish
voyages sailing before January 1, 1870, by which date the chief design and
whalecraft innovations had been made and most had been widely diffused. If
these new techniques had affected productivity favorably, the coefficient
on the variable would be positive.
(j) Competition for Labor
A frequently told story attributes the collapse of the American
whaling fleet to the qualitative deterioration of the vessel crews as the
best labor was bid away by improving onshore opportunities. Real wage
rates ashore certainly were rising through a substantial part of this
period and our preliminary analysis of whaling lays suggests that the
return to whalemen may not have been keeping pace. The pool of seamen
available to man the whalers may very well have deteriorated, with
unfavorable consequences for whaling productivity. With measures of labor
quality this proposition could be tested directly, and we hope to be able
to do so in future. At present, however, we must settle for an indirect
test, employing wage rate data, alone. We first entered wage indexes of
common and skilled labor on shore as independent variables.32 Since the28
two proved to be collinear, we re-ran the regression, using only one wage
series at a time. The choice between the two mattered little: The results
are virtually identical, whether the common or the skilled index is
employed. The coefficient should be negative if the New Bedford whaling
industry really did have a labor problem.
(k) Time at Sea
As the fleet moved into more distant waters, the organization of
hunting was revised to cope with the problems raised by the greater
distances. Resupply and transshipment points were developed; by using
these bases, a vessel could hunt for longer periods and catch more than it
could bring home itself. Organized resupply and transshipment were
important institutional innovations. To capture their influence on
productivity, the interval at sea (actually, the square of the interval)
was entered as an independent variable in the regression equation.
Unfortunately, the variable also picks up other influences, including, for
example, the bad luck (or poor performance) that kept a vessel long at sea
before an adequate cargo was obtained. If the first influence -- the
innovation of the transshipment point --predominated,the coefficient on
this variable should have a positive sign; otherwise, it should have a
negative sign.
(1) Measurement Errors
The "tonnage" for most vessels in the data set refers to old
admeasurement tonnage; in a few cases, however, itrefersto new
adnieasurement tonnage (see footnote 16). A dummy was introduced to deal
with the problem. The coefficient of this dummy should have a negative29
sign.
(m) Time
Finally, time was entered as an independent variable. As will be
evident, the technology variable -- whichis a time dunmy -- leaves
something to be desired and might pick up any of a variety of time-
dependent processes other than technical change. While the
comprehensiveness of the model, both theoretically and empirically reduces
the chances of such an eventuality, we decided to reduce them further by
entering time as a device for detrending (the issue is taken up further
below). The analysis is limited to voyages leaving New Bedford in 1820 or
later. The time variable is, therefore, the year the vessel sailed from
New Bedford minus 1820.
(6) Statistical Results
(a) General Considerations
The general New Bedford data set contains evidence on over 4100
whaling voyages in the period 1790-1906, but this paper is concerned with
only some of them. First, since the industry was unduly affected by
political and military events during the early period, the years before
1820 have been excluded (reducing the universe to fewer than 3,900
voyages). Second, a number of incomplete observations were dropped. As a
result, the regression analysis is based on fewer than 2400 observations,
confined to the period 1820-1896. The sample is a very large one, but is
it representative? If it is representative, of what is it representative?
of New Bedford voyages? of east coast voyages? Unlike many other
Northeastern ports, New Bedford engaged in diversified whaling. It sent30
vessels to every hunting ground, and the port was regarded as
representative of the east coast ports taken together. The sample,
however, was certainly not randomly drawn from all of the east coast
voyages. Indeed, it was not even randomly drawn from the list of New
Bedford voyages.
To test the extent to which the sample resembles the universe of New
Bedford voyages, 1820-1896, we compared average sample and universe values
for each of the outputs, the data on crew numbers, vessel tonnage, and
average voyage time, by hunting ground. On the whole, we found that the
sample over-represents successful voyages.
To test whether this feature of the sample made the regression results
unrepresentative of the behavior of the entire New Bedford fleet, we re-ran
the regression analysis on the relatively unsuccessful voyages alone, i.e.,
on the 1000 voyages with the lowest levels of productivity. In all but
five cases (intercepts and independent variables), the coefficient signs
were the same for the full sample and for the sample of unsuccessful
voyages. In three of the remaining five cases, the interpretation of the
variable was left essentially unchanged, despite the sign change (e.g., low
significance levels; very small coefficients). We concluded, therefore,
that although some features of the full sample may make it imperfectly
representative for some purposes, nonetheless the regression results do
adequately describe New Bedford whaling. Although we cannot demonstrate
the matter rigorously, we also believe that the regressions capture the
nature of east coast whaling as a whole.31
(b) The Model
The results of the first regression (#1) appear in Table 10. The
equation explains almost half of the productivity variance, a level of
explanatory power that is excellent for a pooled cross section-time series
data set, particularly given the nature of this industry. It is well known
that the variation between the performances of one vessel and another could
be extremely wide and that whalemen attributed such variations in some
considerable measure to luck. The Dias data also show that certain vessels
--andprobably certain agents and captains --typicallyperformed above
standard, and others, typically below. Even in these cases, however,
performance varied from one voyage to the next. No attempt has yet been
made to sort these matters out and to see how far the quality of the
vessels, agents, and captains differed one from the other (although these
are feasible projects). The regression equation leaves luck out of account
and deals only indirectly with the quality of captain and crew. Not all of
the variables conform precisely to the theoretical requirements. With
these matters in mind the degree of explanatory success attained by the
equation seems very high.33
(b-i) Strong Priors
We had strong expectations as to the signs on the coefficients of six
of the variables in the equation. Specifically, we expected positive signs
on the vessel size variable, on the Arctic dummy, and on the technological
date dummy, while we expected negative signs on the wage series and on the
tonnage measurement and last voyage dummies. In every case the signs are
as expected, while the coefficients are large and, in all cases but one,
significantly different from zero at the one percentlevel.3432
(b-2) Weak Priors
We had expected productivity in the Indian and Pacific oceans to
exceed productivity in the Atlantic, and the regression confirms our
expectations. The Pacific, the ocean to which most voyages were made,
proves to have been, on average, a more productive hunting ground than the
Indian Ocean, but not by a wide margin. Per our expectations, ships were
more productive, on average, than other vessels.
(b-3) Tests of Hypotheses in the Literature
Contemporary comment and the subsequent literature on whaling suggest
that productivity may have been adversely affected by over-hunting, on the
one hand, and heavy competition among whalers, on the other. Our study of
data on whale stocks, the procreative capacities of whales, and the level
of hunting in the nineteenth century led us to doubt that over-hunting was
a major problem;35 the possibility that competition may have reduced
productivity seemed more likely to us, a priori.
In the cases of the hunting pressure indexes, our guesses are shown to
have been correct. Both indexes carry small coefficients of the wrong
sign, one not significantly different from zero at conventional levels of
significance. The coefficient of the competition variable has the sign
that a reading of the literature would lead one to expect, but it is very
small, as is the tvalueassociated with it.36
(b-4) Complex Variables
Three sets of variables capture the effects of more than one
influence, which made the signs and values of the coefficients of the
variables difficult to predict. The favorable influence of the33
transshipment innovation was apparently overborne by the unfavorable
influence of long, unsuccessful hunts (the coefficient on voyage length is
negative). The large catches associated with the opening of the Arctic
appear to have formed the measured effect of mode of entry on productivity.
The regression shows no significant productivity difference between
transfers and vessels built for the fleet. Rerigged vessels, however,
exhibit a modest but significant advantage, an advantage that presumably
reflects as much the date of their entry to the fleet as any underlying
technical superiority.
Finally, the age variables no doubt reflect the experience of
successful survivors, but it is clear that the unfavorable effects of aging
also figure in the results. The measured level of productivity turns down
at about the age of fifty, if the coefficients on age and age squared are
to be believed. That figure would probably not have surprised whaling men
of the nineteenth century, who were accustomed to vessels that lasted much
longer than this in the whaling trade.37 It may be that, properly
refitted, an old vessel was, indeed, only very modestly inferior to what it
had been when new. Certainly there is some suggestion of this idea in the
literature, and these results appear to add additional support.
(b-5) No Priors
Time was entered as a detrending variable, while the specialization
indexes were incorporated in our effort to cope with an undesirable feature
of the productivity index. The coefficient on time is very small -- even
allowing for the nuniber of years covered by the equation -- andis not
significantly different from zero (the t value is very small). There is
the suggestion here that the equation is comprehensive, leaving no role for34
time, but we return to this point below.
Both of the specialization dummies carry negative coefficients, the
one for sperm whalers a very large one. Since there is no good reason to
believe that sperm whalers were, indeed, at so dramatic a disadvantage, the
strong suggestion is that the productivity index, even with missing values
supplied (see above), understates the productivity of specialist vessels.
The specialist variables correct for this feature of the index, however, so
that the regression results should not be unduly influenced by the problem.
(c) Interaction Terms
In two respects it appeared before the fact that the model could be
improved by introducing interaction terms. Specifically, the advantages of
the bark were said to be pronounced only in the Arctic, while ships were
believed to have important advantages in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
The matter could be explored by interacting the vessel type and hunting
ground dummy variables. Furthermore, the institutional advantage of the
refitting and transshipment port were exploited only by vessels sailing to
the Indian, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. Interacting voyage length and
hunting ground might, then, reveal the favorable consequences of this
institutional innovation, consequences that are not exhibited in the
coefficient of the voyage duration variable of the first equation.
In fact, these procedures throw no new light on the problem of whaling
productivity. The signs on the voyage duration -huntingground
interactions are all negative. We are unable to separate out the favorable
effects of the institutional innovations. The vessel type-hunting ground
interactions have the correct signs, but the differences among them are not
large. Little additional is learned from them.35
(d) Technical Changes and Labor Quality: Some Further Thoughts
Whiletheregression analysis unfolds reasonably and seems to reveal
important aspects of forces at work on U.S. whaling productivity, some of
the variables are less than perfect and pose interpretive problems. Two
sets of these variables --measuringtechnical changes and labor quality --
deservefurther attention.
New technology did diffuse very rapidly, so that the use of a time
dummy to proxy technical changes is certainly reasonable. (See Appendix
2.) The fact remains, however, that the dummy is only an indirect
indicator of technical change, and could be picking up the effects of some
other time-dependent process. It would be helpful to have direct evidence
of the tools and methods employed by the whalers in our sample.
Most whalers had an outfitting book that listed the gear aboard the
vessel at the beginning of each voyage. One part of the book was devoted
to ttwhalecraft,tt the implements used to capture the whale. As we have
indicated, among the three sets of technical changes those that appear to
have had the greatest impacts on productivity were innovations in
whalecraft. Whales were frequently lost because a harpoon failed to hold
or because the whale smashed the attacking boat before the boatheader was
able to dispatch it. Innovations were devised to make the harpoon more
secure and the lance, more deadly. The two-flued harpoon was partly
replaced by the more secure one-flued harpoon, and that device was, in
turn, replaced by the toggle iron. Boatheaders shifted from common lances,
to steel lances, to bomb lances shot from guns, to the deadly darting gun.
(See Appendix 2.)
Some outfitting lists have survived and we have managed to assemble
seventy-five that can be used to establish the gear that was actually36
aboard the vessels in the sample. Unfortunately, however, the range of
experience depicted in these lists is very narrow: there is, for example,
little usable evidence on the darting gun. Thus the comparisons that can
be drawn depend on very little hard evidence:
Average
Productivity Index
vessels with toggle irons 69 .655
vessels w/o toggle irons 6 .481
vessels with bomb lances 68 .649
vessels w/o bomb lances 7 .567
The mean productivity of the voyages using advanced gear was greater than
the mean productivity of the rest, but the sample sizes are small and the
differences between the sample means are not significant (student's t). We
also ran various regressions in which the technological date dummy was
replaced by dummies relating to the use of toggle irons and whale guns.
Not surprisingly, none was very illuminating. The regression in Table 11
is characteristic.
It will be observed that only one of the technological variables has
the right sign, and neither carries a coefficient significantly different
from zero at a conventionally acceptable level. In view of the very
limited number of vessels outfitted with the earlier technology, and in the
absence of evidence on the darting gun, the regression results cannot be
taken to be a very serious challenge to the view that improved whalecraft
technology did, indeed, raise whaling productivity. Settling the matter
definitively will require the acquisition of more outfitting books; but if,
as we believe, the new technology did diffuse very rapidly, even more
outfitting evidence may not make it possible to distinguish the effects of
technical change from other time-dependent processes.3837
The wage variables were introduced into the regressions to test an
hypothesis drawn from the whaling literature: as wage rates ashore went
up, the best men were bid out of whaling, the quality of crews
deteriorated, and productivity fell. Our modeling of this hypothesis seems
straight-forward enough, linking, as it does, the underlying cause (higher
wage rates ashore) with the ultimate consequence (lower productivity). We
also believe, as we indicated above, that wage rates ashore rose relative
to the earnings of whalemen. The middle step in the argument, however, is
by-passed: the deterioration of the quality of crews. Did crews really
decline in quality? We are presently exploring this question by collecting
signatures and marks as well as stations from the crew lists. While this
task is as yet incomplete, the data assembled so far strongly suggest that
both literacy and the skill level among crewmen fell markedly, in the
1840's and 1850's. If the analysis confirms these conjectures we should be
able to conclude that the testimony of the whaling literature and of the
coefficients on the wage variables in the regressions is correct: the
quality of whaling crews did decline, as time passed.
The wage series pose a second problem. We know that the productivity
index for the fleet as a whole declined from 1820 to the 1860's, while the
wage rate ashore rose. The strong negative association between the wage
series and the vessel productivity series may, therefore, describe only the
numerical relations between two trends that, in fact, have no true
theoretical connection. The latter proposition could be tested by
differencing or detrending the data. Such a procedure is not appropriate
in the present case, however. The hypothesis in the literature is, in
fact, an hypothesis relating to trends. That is, the argument is not that
a rise in wages ashore in year 1 reduced the quality of whaling seaman in38
year 1, and that a decline in wages ashore in year 2 raised the quality of
seamen in that year. The argument is that a persistent, strong increase in
the wage rate ashore led to the deterioration of whaling crews.
Nonetheless, we did attempt a species of detrending, above and beyond
that attempted in equation #1. First, we restricted the regression to
voyages departing after 1833 -- aperiod that saw productivity first fall
and then rise, finally re-achieving in the 1890's the levels attained sixty
years before. Second, in order to allow for the remaining long-term
variations in productivity, we entered time and time squared variables.
The regression appears in Table 12.
It will be observed that the common wage coefficient retains a large
negative value and is significantly different from zero at better than the
one percent level. The correlations between the coefficients of the two
time variables and the common wage coefficient are also very small (-.082
and -.035). The wage series appears to be capturing something other than
time. The suggestion that the quality of whalemen deteriorated, as
opportunities ashore improved, and that the decline in the quality of crews
tended to lower productivity, ceteris paribus, is strengthened.39
Two other features of the regression are worthy of notice. First, the
signs, coefficient values, and significance levels of most of the variables
are very similar to those in Table 10, which is reassuring, since it
suggests that we have identified stable relationships. The significance
levels are also very high, across the board.
Second, one might have supposed, before the fact, that the
introduction of time squared might displace the technological dummy -- a
dummy that divides the observations at January 1, 1870. The reason for
this expectation is that productivity turned up late in the period (see the39
chart), so that one could expect time squared to carry a positive
coefficient, which it does. Notice, however, that the technological dummy
retains a large coefficient, significantly different from zero at the one
percent level. The correlation matrix also shows clearly that the
technological dummy is not simply a version of time squared. The
correlation between the coefficients on the technological dummy and time
squared is only 0.0144.
(7) Conclusions
After 1820 a series of changes in the economic environment pressured
whaling agents to change their ways. The rapid growth of the demand for
lubricants and illuminants led agents to send their captains farther and
farther from home in search of whale and sperm oil. The whalemen opened
rich grounds in the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. The
subsequent change in the structure of demand for whaling products --a
change that favored whale bone over sperm and whale oil --sentcaptains to
the North Pacific in search of right whales. One of them was venturesome
enough to push through the Bering Strait into the Bering Sea, where he
found a profusion of the greatest of the bone whales, the bowhead. He was
quickly followed by many other captains.
These shifts in demand and in hunting grounds, coupled with emerging
labor problems, led the agents to re-organize the industry. In place of
the fourteen-month voyage to Davis Strait and the Atlantic, typical of the
early nineteenth century, voyages of two, three, and even four or more
years to the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and the Western Arctic had become
common by mid-century. Different vessel types (ships in the Pacific; barks
in the Arctic) and new designs of each type (clipper style, with heavy use40
of power winches) were adopted. The new designs came in part from
unspecialized builders for the merchant marine, and in part from ship
architects specializing in whalers. Longer voyages meant the adoption of
larger vessels of each type and the development of re-supply and trans-
shipment points in Hawaii and Panama. In the whale boats, the whaling gun
replaced the hand-held lance, and toward the end, the darting gun, the most
effective American whalecraft innovation, was widely adopted. The agents
responded to the economic and technical stimuli. They reacted quickly and
effectively. For example, when the writing was on the wall -- whenthe
Arctic had become the most profitable hunting ground, when steamers proved
the most effective whalers, and when the transcontinental rail lines were
in place -- theyabandoned New Bedford and reberthed their vessels in San
Francisco.
These changes in environment and the reactions to them by the agents
affected productivity in ways nicely captured in the regression appearing
in Table 10. The clearest and most powerful environmental change was the
deterioration in the quality of labor, occasioned by competition ashore.
According to the coefficient on the common wage variable, productivity fell
.006 points for every point the real wage ashore went up. Since the real
common wage ashore rose by 52 points between 1820 and 1860 and another 34
points between 1860 and 1895, the effect was a strong one. Thus, if we
press these results as far as we can -- perhapsharder than they should be
--thecommon wage variable ttaccountstt for a decline of .504 in the
productivity index across the full period. Given a dependent mean of .733,
this is a very powerful effect, indeed.
The changing quality of labor may also be hidden in a second variable,
the one concerned with voyage length. This paper had been completed to41
this point in its present form when we encountered Charles Nordhoff's
little book, Whaling and Fishing.4° Nordhoff's account strongly suggests
that the quality of crews deteriorated as voyage length went up. Except
when whales were actually under attack, whaling was immensely boring,
particularly for seamen accustomed to the constant activity of a
merchantman, or a naval vessel, or even a fishing smack. As voyages
increased in length, the boredom became unbearable and the rate of
desertion increased dramatically, a point made by many students of the
industry. Nordhoff claims that the problem became so serious that
recruiters began to by-pass seamen and recruit the greenest of green hands.
These hands, since they had not had the experience of merchant service,
might be less likely to be unfavorably affected by the tedium of the
voyage, but also their prospects on desertion were dim. A seaman could
desert and easily pick up another vessel. Not so a green hand who had
nothing but his brief whaling experience.
Whether or not Nordhoff is right as to the recruitment practices of
agents, the variable "voyage length" may pick up the unfavorable
consequence of the rising desertion rate, in addition to the factors
previously discussed. Indeed, it may well be that this factor is the most
important one influencing the coefficient on the variable "voyage length."
The reactions of agents to these -- andother -- environmentalchanges
are also captured nicely in the regression. There are, first, the shifts
in hunting ground, the movement first into the Pacific, with its vast
supplies of sperm whales, and then into the Western Arctic, in pursuit of
the bowhead. These changes can be though of as the results of a persistent
search for better hunting grounds, the agents adjusting activities in ways
that raised productivity. There is also, however, another aspect of them:42
they reflect the changing structure of demand. The drive into the Pacific
in the 20's, 30's and 40's was motivated by the high price of sperm oil;
the drive into the Western Arctic after 1848, by the market for baleen.
All of the preceding discussion of the regression, while it is
concerned with productivity change, leaves technical considerations aside.
This point is an important one. The principal environmental influences on
productivity and some of the chief actions taken by agents to raise
productivity had nothing to do with technology. That point is worth
stressing. Nonetheless, agents also manipulated technological variables
and the results they obtained show up in the coefficients of the regression
in Table 10.
Thus the adoption of ships, as opposed to other rig types, increased
productivity (ceteris paribus) by a substantial amount (coefficient of
+0.11, as compared with a dependent mean of +0.733), presumably reflecting
the advantage of ships in the Indian and Pacific Ocean hunting grounds, the
grounds that were most important throughout the full period. The choice to
re-rig to bark specification with the opening of the Arctic also is shown
to have been an important factor promoting higher productivity (coefficient
of +0.09), while the adoption of improved vessel design and, perhaps more
important, better whale craft, had an enormous effect, according to the
regression (+0.310). The change in vessel size was also favorable,
although of a smaller order of importance. For example, the rise in
average ship size between 1821-35 and 1871-75 improved productivity only
+0.006, according to the regression coefficient.
The regression, then, effectively describes the chief influences
bearing on whaling productivity, including the activities of agents. A
substantial part --alittle over half --ofthe variance is left43
unexplained, however. The place to seek for further enlightenment is
surely among the human actors in this drama. How far did the identity of
the agent matter? Presumably there were good agents and bad ones. How far
did the quality of the agent determine the result of the voyage? The same
question may be asked with respect to the captain. Did crews regularly
break up after each voyage, or were some crews kept together to sail a
second and a third time? If so, were such crews more effective? All of
these queries can be treated with the data set detailed in this paper and
all will be the subject of our attention in the months ahead.44
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Whale Stock Pressure Indexes
General Procedures
We began by assembling Frost's data on the initial stock of mature
female sperm whales for each of the oceans in which sperm whales are found:
the Atlantic (Frost's Divisions 1 and 2), Indian (Divisions 3-5), and
Pacific (Divisions 69).1 We then used the parameters from Frost's sperm
whale model (pp. 254-256, especially 257-260) to estimate the maximum
sustainable yield in each ocean. Next we distributed the U.S. catch of
sperm oil among the three oceans on the basis of the New Bedford catch,
which we derived from the Dias-Hegarty data set, described in the text. We
converted the catch into numbers of whales killed, following Starbuck's
procedure, and computed four-year moving averages.2 These averages, dated
to the year following (e.g., 1816-19 =1820).were expressed as ratios of
the maximum sustainable yield relevant to the particular hunting ground.
The ratios, which reflect relative pressures on whale stocks (differing by
year and by ground), were then associated with the voyage data. Thus, a
vessel leaving New Bedford in 1820 to hunt in the Pacific would have an
associated "pressure index" of 1820 (reflecting average hunting 1816-19)
for the Pacific Ocean. We used four-year averages so that the indexes
would reflect the hunting pressures over an extended period, but there is
nothing sacrosanct about the number four. It could easily have been a
larger or a smaller number.
There are many things wrong with the sperm hunting "pressure index,"
but it is clearly the best option open to us, and we think that it is a
satisfactory proxy for the relative degree of sperm population depletion,50
by hunting ground and by year.3 Similar procedures were followed in the
case of baleens.
Maximum Sustainable Yield
In order to produce indexes of the pressure placed on whale stocks by
U.S. hunting in the nineteenth century, we were obliged to estimate the
maximum sustainable yields of the sperm whale populations inhabiting the
Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans (a separate estimate for each
population) and the baleen whale populations inhabiting the Bering Strait
and Okhotsk Sea (taken together), and the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian
oceans (taken together). The absolute levels of these estimates matter not
at all; all that matter are the relative levels among hunting grounds and
years for each of the two broad whale types.(Even relative levels between
the two broad whale types do not matter.) Since the initial population
numbers establish these relative differences, we could have adopted
procedures producing only rough estimates of the true maximum sustainable
yields. Our actual methods, while entirely adequate, were probably too
elaborate for the purpose.
According to Frost, the natural rate of mortality of sperm whales is
about 0.133 for the first two years of life and 0.05 thereafter (p. 257 --
butsee, also, Allen, pp. 9, lO). We assumed a static population with an
unchanging number of births each year. Given Frost's death rate data, and
the assumption of numerical equality between the sexes at each age, we were
able to estimate the age-sex structure of the population. Frost says that
the sperm whale population models assume females reach the age of sexual
maturity at between 8.5 and 10 years (p. 257). We chose 10 years, which
implies an average pregnancy rate of .22 in the stationary population (a51
figure .03 higher than the one used by Frost). Since the maximum pregnancy
rate is .25, according to Frost, the implied ratio of net increase to the
sexually mature female population is .03 (assuming that the structures of
the stationary and maximum yield populations are the same).
The maximum sustainable yield is achieved at various female population
levels, depending upon the form in which the yield is to be obtained (i.e.
in females alone, or in males alone, or in females and males combined, or
in weight) (Frost, p. 260). We assumed that the yield was to be taken in
females alone, and therefore computed the yield against a mature female
population 60 percent of the original level (Frost, p. 260).
Without any doubt, our sperm M.S,Y. estimates are too low. One could
make a good case that the Frost "net pregnancy rate" of 0.06 should have
been used in place of our derived 0.03, and that we should have computed
the yield on the assumption that it was to be taken disproportionately in
the form of males. Moving to these assumptions would have produced much
larger M.S.Y. estimates and much lower indexes of hunting pressure on the
sperm whale stocks. But it would not have altered the relative levels of
the indexes from year to year or from hunting ground to hunting ground.
The regression requires that there be a pressure index for each
hunting ground for each type of whale. Since there are virtually no sperm
whales in the Arctic, we were obliged to produce a synthetic value for this
type of whale for this ocean. We used the average value of the indexes for
all other oceans. The coefficient on this index for the Arctic has no
substantive meaning.
We used the same mortality rates and population structure in the
estimating procedures for baleens. We assumed a maximum pregnancy rate of
.50 (e.g., Burton, p. 86) and an age of sexual maturity of 10.5. Both52
these estimates may be too high (e.g., see Matthews, p. 84), but the errors
tend to offset and, in the event, they seem to have offset very well.5 At
least it is true that the crude birth rate implied by our simple model is
almost identical with the crude birth rate observed by D. W. Rice and A. A.
Wolman among the California gray whales during the recovery of this group
from over-hunting.6 The implied crude death rate, however, while at the
level of the average for sperm whales (Allen, p. 10), is about two
percentage points below the death rate found by Rice and Wolman among the
grays. The difference may reflect the fact that smaller whales, such as
the grays, have higher mortality rates than larger ones (Allen, p. 9),
presumably in part because they suffer the depredations of the killer
whales, while the larger types do not. It is also possible that our
mortality estimate is too low and that, as a result, our estimated M.S.Y.
level is too high. Once again it is worth remarking that for our purposes
such an error matters not at all, as long as the relative levels of the
hunting pressure index numbers among years and hunting grounds are correct.
Whether they are depends not on the M.S.Y. estimates but on the estimates
of the initial population levels.
Estimates of Whales Killed
The estimates of the numbers of whales killed were based on the
quantity of sperm and baleen oil brought back by hunters, following
procedures established by Alexander Starbuck. That technique works well
for sperm whales, and for baleen whales through the 1870's. After 1880 the
ratio of oil to baleen brought back drops sharply. Whalers were probably
abandoning blubber, a rational response to the dramatically changing
relative prices of baleen and oil. For the years after 1878, therefore,53
the estimate of the number of whales killed was based on the amount of
baleen brought back. To produce the estimate it was necessary to infer
from the baleen returned the amount of oil that could have been obtained
from the whales that produced the baleen. This estimate (3.49 gallons per
pound of bone) was derived from the returns of U.S. hunting in the period
immediately preceding the 1880's.
Competition Index
The number of exploitable sperm whales in each hunting ground
(Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian) was taken from Frost. We defined the
Atlantic as Frost's divisions 1 and 2, the Indian, 3, 4, and 5, and the
Pacific, 6, 7, 8, and 9. We then converted exploitable whale stocks to
total whale stocks, per James Scharff.7 Gray whales were allocated to the
Pacific, bowheads, to the western Arctic and to the North Atlantic, per
Frost (pp. 266-267). We accepted Allen's estimates (p. 19) of the number
of humpbacks and rights in the North Pacific, and the latter were allocated
to the Arctic.8 Frost's estimates of the number of humpbacks and rights in
the Southern Hemisphere (converted from exploitable to total numbers, per
Scharff) were divided among the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans in
proportion to the number of sperm whales in these oceans.
Whales are not of equal size or equal value, but we made no attempt to
adjust for these matters. On the whole, baleens were bigger, but yielded
less valuable output, ton for ton, than sperm whales. Summing up without
weighting is a reasonable enough procedure.
Hunting voyages differed in duration, from time to time, hunting
ground to hunting ground, and voyage to voyage. Again, we made no effort
to introduce these subtleties into our index numbers. We assumed that a54
vessel arriving in New Bedford from the Pacific, in, say, 1830 was affected
during its whaling voyage by the amount of competition from vessels leaving
for the Pacific in 1828. Thus if the vessel had hunted in the Pacific and
had returned to New Bedford in 1830, it was assigned the "competition index
numbert' for 1828. We were unable to allow for competition offered by
vessels other than those sailing from New Bedford.
We assumed that the western Arctic encompassed about 2.17 million
square miles (one-ninth of the Arctic Sea --representingthe Chukchi Sea
--theBering Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Bering Strait); the
Atlantic, about 10 million square miles (roughly one-third of the area of
the Atlantic); the Pacific, about 22 million square miles (roughly one-
third of the area of the Pacific); the Indian, about 7 million square miles
(roughly one-quarter of the area of the Indian Ocean). These estimates
rest on data from the Columbia Gazeteer of the World (New York, 1962) and
maps showing whale migration routes in The Times Atlas of the World,
Comprehensive Edition (New York, 1980).55
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Appendix 2
The Diffusion of Whalecraft Innovations
"There has been as great a revolution in the mode of killing whales
during the past twenty years, as there has been in the art of naval
warfare; were it not for this, but few whalers would now be afloat. .
CharlesM. Scammon, The Marine Mammals of the North-Western Coast of
America (San Francisco, 1874), p. 226.
Scammon refers to whalecraft innovations, which he believes produced
effects in 20 years roughly equivalent to the changes in vessel design and
other aspects of outfitting that took place in the period between the 17th
and late 19th centuries. This appendix describes the principal innovations
and investigates the speed of their adoption)
The American style of whaling involved (1) a sailing vessel (later in
the period some had auxiliary steam power) and (2) several small (28 to 30
feet by 6 feet), light whaling boats, from which the attack on the whale
was made. The equipment in the boat and the attack on the whale depended
somewhat on the type of whale involved and the place of the attack. Gray
whales and humpbacks were typically taken in bays in shallow water, which
required certain types of equipment (e.g., humpbacks sank when killed, so
that boats had to carry gear to mark them and hold their bodies in place
until, eventually, they rose again; bay hunting called for the use of
anchors, useless in the open sea, where most hunting went on) and permitted
the use of other gear that was not very effective in the rougher waters
outside the bays (the Greener swivel harpoon gun, for example). Sperm
whales were regarded as much more ferocious than rights, requiring special
caution in the attack. Bowheads posed peculiar problems, since they could58
-- anddid -- seekescape from the hunters under the Arctic ice.
Despite these variations the fundamental character of the American
system is clear. It can be described best if we consider the case of, say,
a large bark hunting the Pacific. Slung from davits above the decks of the
bark are four whaling boats; two or three spares are stored elsewhere. Men
are in the cross-trees on watch for whales. When whales are sighted, the
boats are lowered to give chase. Each boat carries six men, five oarsmen
(three starboard and two port) and a steersman, called a boatheader. The
boatheader of each boat is normally a mate. With all four boats on the
sea, there are typically five or six men left to sail the vessel, keep
lookout, and signal the movements of the whales to the boats.
Whale boats were sailed and sometimes rowed. If there was danger that
the sounds of the oars would frighten the whale, they were paddled. The
boat crew attempted to approach the whale closely; if possible, they would
run the boat onto the whale's back, when the forward starboard oarsman --
knownas the boatsteerer or harpooner -- wouldrise and thrust two harpoons
into the whale. Boatsteerer and boatheader would then change places in the
boat and, in the early days of whaling, the latter would slash at the whale
with a sharp implement called a spade, in an effort to sever the tendons in
the whale's flukes (tail) and to cripple him. This dangerous practice was
later generally abandoned.
The purpose of the harpoon was to hook the whale and attach it by a
line to the whaleboat. The weight of the line and the whaleboat were
intended to tire the whale and permit him to be approached once again. The
dispatching of the whale was then left to the boatheader, who killed it
with a tool called a lance, originally a long, hand-held stabbing
implement.59
While the technique remained essentially unchanged, the implements
were improved in important respects. The principal innovations were
introduced between the late 1840's and the mid 1860's and they diffused
during the period of decline of the American fleet.
The most important innovations in harpoons (called "irons" by
whalemen) centered on the mode by which the implement was conveyed from the
boat to the whale, and on the features of the head of the harpoon that
affected its ability to hook the whale.
Most American harpoons were thrust or thrown -- darted,the whalers
said -- byhand. The harpoon was attached to a cut sapling, with bark left
on to improve the grip. The harpooner then thrust or threw the pole. If
he was successful, the harpoon hooked the whale and the pole was detached
and floated away.
Harpoon poles could not be thrown very far; thus attempts were made to
shoot the harpoon from swivel guns and from rocket launchers that closely
resembled the World War II bazooka. The swivel gun was invented at a very
early date and figured importantly in the Scotch and English fisheries, but
it never established itself in the American fisheries, except in the hunt
for gray whales in the California bays. Success with the swivel depended
upon calm seas (otherwise aim was thrown off) and sturdy boats, neither
common in the American fisheries.2
The rocket launcher would seem to have been a more promising line. It
was light and it did not have the kick of a swivel gun, an important matter
for American whalemen, in view of the small, light boats in which they
hunted. According to Lytle, notable whalemen from Scoresby to Rotch to
Roys reported great success with various rocket launchers. Yet there
appears to have been no rush among American whalemen to adopt this60
innovation and its general impact seems to have been negligible.
Innovations respecting the head of the harpoon were numerous and some
were widely and rather quickly diffused. Although the variations on each
style were great, there appear to have been only three basic styles of
harpoon head: the two-flued, the one-flued, and the toggle. The terms are
descriptive. The head of a two-flued harpoon was shaped like an arrow
head, with sharp leading edges and dull following edges, the latter
intended to lodge in the flesh of the whale. Sometimes, however, the two-
flued harpoon pulled out. The one-flued harpoon -- withonly one following
edge --wasdesigned to minimize the chances that would happen, and was
widely regarded as superior to its predecessor. The toggle iron had a head
that turned on a pivet. When the harpoon was being thrown, the head was
held in a fixed position -- sharpedges forward -- bya small, light piece
of wood. When the head entered the whale, the wood broke, the head turned,
and the whale was securely hooked.
The crucial innovation -- datedto 1848 -- appearsto have been the
toggle iron.3 James Durfee, a leading New Bedford manufacturer of
whalecraft, produced 22,133 harpoons between May 15, 1830, and October 29,
1844, all two-flued. Between October 29, 1844, and May 9, 1850, only two
years after the invention of the toggle, he produced 7,526 two-flued
harpoons and 265 toggle irons, while between May 9, 1850, and October 27,
1862, the numbers were almost equal: 20,462 two-flued versus 20,191
toggle. The outfitting books of the bark Ospray list 190 "common" irons
and 50 toggle, in 1854; 40 two-flued, 10 one-flued, and 60 toggle, in 1866;
and 10 two-flued, 11 one-flued, and 90 toggle, in 188O. The bark Louisa
carried all common irons in 1850; 130 common and 50 toggle, in 1853; 42
each of the one- and two-flued and 100 of the toggle, in 1856; 36 two-61
flued, 20 one-flued, and 100 toggle, in 1865; 10 two-flued, 3 one-flued,
and 120 toggle, in l874. The bark Globe listed 36 toggle in 1869.6
Scammon says that a first class whale ship on a Cape Horn voyage in the
early 1870's should carry 15 two-flued and 150 toggle harpoons.7
The examples could readily be multiplied. The lessons seem clear.
According to these records, the two-flued and toggle irons were the
important designs, the one-flued having limited transitional significance.
A clearer and firmer finding is that the toggle iron was adopted quickly,
achieved equal importance with the two-flued iron in the 1850's, but did
not clearly dominate the other forms until the 1870's, a quarter of a
century after its innovation. Even then, outfit books typically called for
a few common irons, in addition to the toggles.
Harpoons were made of iron, the shank of soft iron, to allow it to
bend under pressure and, thus, to reduce the likelihood that the head would
pull out of the whale. Hand lances, however, were to serve not as hooks,
but as stabbing devices, easily thrust into the whale and easily withdrawn,
so that subsequent thrusts could be made. The lance was typically made of
tough wrought iron, mounted on a pole, but the head was frequently of
steel. Lytle says steel was preferred --forobvious reasons -- andthat
it completely displaced wrought iron, .once steel was produced in
quantity in this country... ,"adevelopment presumably associated with a
decline in the relative price of steel.8 In fact, the timing is almost
right. Relative steel prices fell particularly sharply after 1867. If the
ratio of steel to wrought iron prices in 1867 is taken as the base of an
index number series (100) the index fell to 71, in 1870, and 59, in 1875.
Outfitting lists immediately reflected the change: the lists for the Emily
Morgan, 1842-1845, and the ships Julius Caesar, 1837, Magnolia, 1842, and62
Francis Henrietta, 1843, mention no steel-headed lances, while those for
the barks Globe, 1869, and Mary Frazier, 1876, mention no iron-headed hand
lances.1° Scammon's list for the early 1870's also contains no hand lances
with iron heads.11 The Ospray carried half common and half steel-headed
lances in 1854, but its outfit had changed to all steel-headed lances by
1868.
There were other proposals to make the lance deadlier: heat it,
electrify it, poison it. None of these plans came to much, for fairly
obvious reasons: for example, crewmen reasoned (correctly) that if the
poison killed the whale, it might kill them, too, when they handled their
victim. The proposal to make the lance explosive, however, did come to
something. Explosive devices were commonly innovated with new modes of
delivering the lance to the whale, guns of various kinds.
The first set of guns consisted of shoulder guns, similar to shotguns,
and they were intended to be managed by the boatheader. Unfortunately they
produced a substantial kick, that frequently threw the boatheader to the
bottom of the boat, sometimes broke his collar bone, and occasionally
capsized the boat. Much inventive effort was directed toward dealing with
these problems, and eventually the Allen gun -- usuallycalled the Brand
gun because C.C. Brand developed and promoted it --achieveda wide
acceptance. The progress of the shoulder gun is exhibited nicely in the
outfitting lists of the bark Ospray: The lists for 1851 and 1854 show no
whale guns, while those for 1866 and 1868 refer to three (fewer than one
per boat), presumably all shoulder guns. The number rises to six at the
end of the 1860's and the beginning of the 1870's, and remains at six in
1880, one per boat plus two spares. The bark Globe carried four in 1869,
Scammon (early 1870's) calls for four on his Cape Horn whaler, and John63
Williams, Ca. 1880, allowed one gun per boat. The Lottie Beard, a resupply
vessel, Carried eight boxes of guns and lances, in 1886, while the order
books of Frank E. Brown, a New Bedford seller of whaling implements, show
the sale of 1,906 feathered lances --i.e.,lances for shoulder guns --and
only 921 long lances and unspecified lances -- presumablyhand lances -- in
1877 and 1878. By the fall of 1899 and the spring of 1900, Brown listed
only feathered lances and lances for darting guns (discussed below).12
The final whalecraft innovation of note combined in one instrument
most of the important characteristics of harpoon and whaling gun. It
consisted of a gun -- calleda darting gun, or a Pierce gun, for its
inventor --mountedon the staff of a harpoon. When the harpoon was darted
into the whale, a lever was depressed. The gun was fired and an explosive
lance was driven deep into the whale. The Pierce gun could deliver an
explosive lance more accurately than a shoulder gun. The location of the
gun -- closeto the whale when it went off -- meantthat the lance was
delivered with great power, without conveying a "kick" to harpooner or
boat. Finally, the apparatus usually stopped the whale, preventing the
long struggles common when a standard harpoon was placed. In the Arctic,
where there was always danger that a harpooned whale would dive under the
ice, this feature was particularly important.
The darting gun was probably the most effective piece of whalecraft
introduced in the American fishery in the nineteenth century. It developed
late, however. It was invented in 1865 and its diffusion did not begin on
a large scale until the 1870's. The outfitting books of the bark Ospray in
the late 1860's and early 1870's make no mention of darting guns, but two
of them plus fifteen lances appear in 1880. None are on John Williams's
list for Ca. 1882, despite the fact that Williams had in mind an Arctic64
voyage, but Scammon (early 1870's) called for four -- oneper boat --and
50 darting gun bomb-lances. Clearly Scammon saw important uses for the
darting gun, but did not conceive of its replacing all its predecessors:
his list includes 35 steel-headed hand lances, four whaling guns, other
than the darting guns, and 150 shoulder gun bomb-lances. The Frank E.
Brown order books show a steady increase in the relative importance of the
darting gun: the fraction of the total lances supplied by Brown that fit
the darting gun rose from 7 percent, in 1877, to 9 per cent, in 1878, to 14
per cent, in 1879, to 41 per cent, in the fall of 1899 and the spring of
1900. A clearer indication of the change under way is that Brown sold only
eight Brand shoulder guns in the period 1877 through 1879, while he
disposed of 81 Pierce darting guns in the same years.13
In summary, the important whalecraft innovations were made in the
period between 1848 and 1865, and they diffused in the 1850's through at
least the 1880's. The order of adoption ran about as follows: toggle iron
(1848-1870), steel-head lance (1845?-l870), shoulder gun (1855?-1880),
darting gun (l865?-1885?). From the time when the diffusion of the toggle
iron was clearly well under way to the time when the darting gun had made a
substantial impact is an interval of about 30 years. The process began at
about mid century and was over in the early 1880's.65
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ANNUAL AVERAGE VESSEL TONNAGE:




Years USA New Bedford of USA
1816-1825 27775 9906 35.7
1826-1835 70352 35272 50.1
1836-1845 159788 64796 40.6
1846-1855 202143 94382 46.7
1856-1865 156129 93770 60.1
1866-1875 67602 53074 78.5
1876-1885 42967 33934 79.0
1886-1895 28380 7838 27.6
1896-1905 14311 3143 22.0
1816-1845 85971 36665 42.6
1846-1875 144719 80408 55.6
1876-1905 27968 14972 53.5
1816-1905 86694 44046 50.8
Sources
USA: Walter S. Tower, History of the American Whale Fishery
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1907).




Sperm Oil Whale Oil Whale Bone Real Value*
Years (1000's of Gallons) (1000 lbs.) ($l000s)
1816-1825 352 466 11 360
1826-1835 1209 1200 80 1340
1836-1845 1867 2087 299 2591
1846-1855 1404 3322 1377 4256
1856-1865 1421 2483 828 4159
1866-1875 968 1320 440 2236
1876-1885 844 773 233 1797
1886-1895 344 87 78 632
1896-1905 224 11 10 195
1816-1845 1143 1251 130 1430
1846-1875 1264 2375 882 3550
1876-1905 471 290 107 875
1816-1905 959 1305 373 1952
*Real value expressed in $'s of 1880.
Source: Davis, Galiman, Hutchins tape. See text.TABLE 3
VESSEL TONNAGE RETURNING BY GROUND
3369 NEW BEDFORD VOYAGES
Percentage of Returning Tonnage
Years Atlantic Indian Pacific Arctic
1816-1825 55.5 0.3 43.2 0.0
1826-1835 51.7 2.4 46.0 0.0
1836-1845 22.7 20.9 56.0 0.2
1846-1855 3.6 21.6 65.0 9.7
1856-1865 10.8 13.1 58.2 18.0
1866-1875 25.3 10.0 37.7 15.9
1876-1885 41.3 6.6 36.5 15.7
1886-1895 45.5 6.3 48.3 0.0
1896-1905 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1816-1845 43.6 7.9 48.4 0.1
1846-1875 13.9 14.9 53.6 14.5
1876-1905 62.2 4.3 28.3 5.2
1816-1905 24.2 14.3 52.0 9.4
Source: Davis, Gailman, Hutchins tape. See text.TABLE 4
AVERAGE VOYAGE LENGTHS IN MONTHS BY GROUND
NEW BEDFORD SHIPS AND BARKS
Years Atlantic Indian Pacific Arctic
Panel A: Ships
1816-1825 12.2 -- 24.2 --
1826-1835 12.2 14.8 33.3 --
1836-1845 20.7 24.9 36.3 21.0
1846-1855 26.9 33.7 37.5 34.8
1856-1865 20.5 41.0 43.6 41.3
1866-1875 22.0 42.0 47.2 46.9
1876-1885 36.3 40.5 37.6 8.8
1886-1895 37.6 -- 33.6 --
1896-1905 -- - - - - - -
1816-1905 17.0 32.1 37.6 38.9
Panel B: Barks
1816-1825 12.3 -- 32.0 --
1826-1835 12.6 23.0 30.3 --
1836-1845 18.7 22.4 35.5 21.0
1846-1855 24.0 34.0 37.6 38.1
1856-1865 23.7 40.3 44.4 42.4
1866-1875 27.6 41.4 45.2 52.1
1876-1885 32.9 38.8 33.4 16.2
1886-1895 32.6 35.7 34.7 --
1896-1905 28.3 -- -- --
1815-1905 26.4 36.1 39.8 36.2
Source: Davis, Gailman, Hutchins tape. See text.TABLE 5
VESSEL RIGGING TYPES
ANNUAL AVERAGES OF PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
NEW BEDFORD FLEET
Percentage of Total Tonnage
Years Ships Barks Other
1816-1825 87.0 5.2 7.8
1826-1835 87.5 9.8 2.8
1836-1845 83.4 15.0 1.6
1846-1855 75.2 23.9 0.1
1856-1865 56.5 42.8 0.6
1866-1875 34.3 64.0 1.8
1876-1885 25.6 67.6 6.8
1886-1895 23.1 65.0 11.9
1896-1905 0.0 73.3 26.6
1816-1845 85.1 12.4 2.5
1846-1875 59.0 40.1 0.9
1876-1905 23.4 67.5 9.1
1816-1905 62.2 35.5 2.4




1816—25 3.0 0.0 3.1
1826—35 1.5 2.7 17.4
1836—45 1.7 0.8 11.2
1846—55 3.0 3.8 7.9
1856—65 2.7 3.7 27.3
1866—75 3.5 5.4 8.0
1876—85 3.8 2.6 10.4
1886—95 0.0 0.5 1.8
1896—1905 ——— 3.1 4.7
Avg.b 2.6 3.5 8.7
Avg.C 2.4 2.8 10.2
Source: L.E. Davis, R.E. Gallman, T.D. Hutchins, 'The Structure
of the Capital Stock in Economic Growth and Decline," in
Peter Kilby (ed.), Quantity and Quidity (}4iddletown, CT:
1987),p.382.






Years Ships Barks Other
1816-1825 20.9 14.3 14.0
1826-1835 23.4 19.8 14.8
1836-1845 26.3 22.7 16.8
1846-1855 29.1 25.8 18.3
1856-1865 30.0 27.1 20.1
1866-1875 30.9 27.4 17.7
1876-1885 31.1 27.8 18.3
1886-1895 33.0 28.4 16.5
1896-1905 26.4 17.0
1816-1905 27.5 26.5 17.1
Source: Davis, Galiman, Hutchins tape. See text.TABLE 8




















1816- 1905 10.6 8.2 2.1
Source: Davis, Gailman, Hutchins tape. See text.
1816-1825 1.2 2.1 1.7 4.3 0.1 3.2
1826-1835 1.4 1.8 2.2 3.2 1.8 0.4
1836-1845 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.3
1846-1855 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.7 1.0 0.2
1856-1865 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.7
1866-1875 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.1 0.7 11.8
1876-1885 0.9 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.5 0.4
1886-1895 1.0 1.4 2.9 0.3 0.4 0.2
1896-1905 -- 3.6 3.5 -- 0.1 0.1
1816-1845 1.2 1.7 1.9 3.1 1.2 1.3
1846-1875 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.5
1876-1905 1.0 2.0 2.7 0.7 0.7 0.2








































AVERAGE PROFITS RATES (PERCENT)
NEW BEDFORD FLEET
Years Ships Barks Other
1816-1825 40.5 22.6 30.5
1826-1835 54.8 54.1 28.9
1836-1845 39.7 34.5 21.1
1846-1855 38.3 32.1 LOSS
1856-1865 45.4 46.8 68.7
1866-1875 51.9 42.2 44.7
1876-1885 70.2 92.5 50.2
1886-1895 33.5 38.3 57.5
1896-1905 70.9 69.2
1816-1905 43.7 48.7 39.6
Source: L.E. Davis, R.E. Galiman, T.D. Hutchins, "The Structure of the
Capital Stock in Economic Growth and Decline," in Peter Kilby
(ed.), Quantity and Quiddity (Middleton, CT, 1987), data
underlying Table 10.22.= 103.1
Adj. R = .478





Vessel type: ships compared with
all other vessels
TABLE 10









Western Arctic (compared with Pacific)
Time
Mode of entry into the fleet:
Built for fleet
Rerigged (compared with vessels






Vessel size (tons squared)




Real common wage rate ashore




























-0.0314Notes to Table 10:
*** Significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level
Durbin-Watson D 1.823
1st order autocorrelation 0.086
Source: See text.
(a) The t statistics were adjusted to allow for the large size of the
sample:
Adjusted t =coefficient/adjustedstandard error
PopulationSample Size Adjusted s.e. =s.e.xiPopulation
-1
(b) The equation was also run in natural logs. The fit was poorer,
while the results did not change substantially.
(c) A priori there is no strong reason to expect heteroskedasticity
or, if it exists, to anticipate serious problems with it, in view of the
enormous size of the sample compared with the universe. Nonetheless, since
the data are panel data we tested for heteroskedasticity by regressing the
variances of the error terms against the continuous explanatory variables,
and the test turned up evidence of heteroskedasticity. We made corrections
by dividing the dependent and independent variables by the standard errors
of the residuals and ran the regression again. The significance levels did
not deteriorate and the results did not change substantively.TABLE 11
















Mode of entry into the fleet:
Built for fleet
Rerigged (compared with vessels







Vessel size (tons squared)




***Significant at the 1 percent level





































Vessel type: Ships compared




Western Arctic (compared with Pacific)
Time
Time squared
Mode of entry into the fleet:
Built for fleet
Rerigged (compared with vessels






Vessel size (tons squared)




Real common wage ashore
Ratio, real skilled wage ashore to




































-0.2111Notes to Table 12:
***Significantlydifferent from zero at 1 percent level.
**Significantlydifferent from zero at 5 percent level.
*Significantlydifferent from zero at 10 percent level.
Durbin-Watson D 1.862
1st order autocorrelation 0.067
See Table 10, note (a).
Source: See text.